00:00:00
So I want to start out by
finishing off the discussion
00:00:04
that we began last class about
ways of thinking about the
00:00:10
perplexity that the trolley
case gives rise to.
00:00:13
And you'll remember that the
perplexities that the trolley
00:00:16
case gives rise to is that
there's an apparent asymmetry
00:00:20
in our responses to the
bystander case and the fat man
00:00:24
case, even though both of them
seem arguably to involve
00:00:29
killing one in order
to save five.
00:00:33
And we looked, last class, at
Judy Thomson's response, which
00:00:38
says, look, there's no asymmetry
in the two cases,
00:00:42
because when we reflect on the
additional hypothetical case
00:00:45
where there's a third track on
which you, yourself, are
00:00:48
standing, we come to recognize
that it's not morally
00:00:52
acceptable to turn in Bystander,
just as it's not
00:00:55
morally acceptable to
push in Fat Man.
00:00:58
At the other extreme, we
looked at Josh Greene's
00:01:01
response, which was that just as
it's morally acceptable to
00:01:04
turn the trolley in Bystander,
it's morally acceptable to
00:01:08
push the man in Fat Man.
00:01:10
And to the extent that we're
getting differential responses
00:01:13
in those cases, says Greene,
it's due to the fact that the
00:01:17
emotional part of our brain
response mechanism is
00:01:22
activated by the up close and
personal nature of the fat man
00:01:26
case, and as a result, we give
an answer that he thinks
00:01:31
remains morally unjustified.
00:01:33
And what we started to think
about at the end of last
00:01:36
lecture was a third possibility,
which lies
00:01:39
somewhere in between the Thomson
and the Greene, though
00:01:42
closer to the Greene.
00:01:44
And that's Cass Sunstein's
argument that though our
00:01:47
responses differ, and perhaps
differ in ways that will be
00:01:51
impossible for us to change,
the cases are
00:01:55
the same, deep down.
00:01:57
And he's inclined, though not as
certain as Josh Greene is,
00:02:01
to think that if we want the
cases to come together, what
00:02:05
we ought to do is to
push the fat man.
00:02:07
And you'll recall that
his argument there
00:02:10
proceeded as follows.
00:02:11
He suggested that in that
in non-moral cases, it's
00:02:13
uncontroversial that we make
use of heuristics, and that
00:02:17
those heuristics, though useful,
frequently lead us to
00:02:21
errors, and then went on to
contend that just as this
00:02:26
occurs in non-moral cases,
so too does it
00:02:29
occur in moral cases.
00:02:30
And we left at the end of last
class thinking about what goes
00:02:35
on in Sunstein argument that
in moral cases people often
00:02:42
And you will call that he gave
a couple of examples from
00:02:45
Jonathan Haidt's work of cases
where people were expressing
показать еще
русский▼
English
